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NFAC #1854-81

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 92/81
1 April 1981
Copy 5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff

THROUGH: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Wartime Intelligence Requirements

1. Per your request, we have reviewed the document on the subject, forwarded by your 25 March memorandum. As described in the attached comments, we have identified some deficiencies in the approach used in this study:

- a. The crises and conflict phases are not clearly defined.
- b. The rationales for the reporting time-periods are not evident.
- c. Some of the reporting requirements and associated time-frames appear to be based upon unrealistic assumptions about the likely nature of Presidential decisionmaking during wartime.
- d. It is noted that the demands on degraded intelligence assets, as indicated in the statement of requirements, would be greater than the demand on undamaged intelligence assets during pre-war crises.

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2. In view of the problems cited above, we suggest a more definitive approach to development of foreign intelligence requirements of the Presidency relevant to a nuclear conflict:

- a. Describe explicitly the several situations or phases to which information requirements are related.
- b. For each phase, list the types of decisions that the President could be expected to make.

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
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SP - 92/81

SUBJECT: Wartime Intelligence Requirements

c. Prepare statements of intelligence requirements to support Presidential decisionmaking for each phase, instead of a set of requirements that are applicable to all four phases.

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David S. Brandwein

Attachment

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SP - 92/81

SUBJECT: Wartime Intelligence Requirements

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NFAC #1854-81
SP - 92/81

1 April 1981

COMMENTS ON "WARTIME INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS,"PREPARED BY THE NICEP

1. The foreign intelligence information requirements attached to your memorandum, subject "Wartime Intelligence Requirements" dated 25 March 1981, appear sufficient to permit decisions by the National Command Authority for the conduct of US military operations during a nuclear exchange. We do not believe, however, that the statement of essential tasks for principal concerns of the Presidency and the associated statement of foreign intelligence information requirements provide an adequate basis to plan for the Continuity of Government, namely, to determine the systems and facilities required for intelligence collection, dissemination and analysis during and following a nuclear conflict.

2. We do not believe it is practical to describe in a single list, the foreign intelligence information requirements of the Presidency under the four circumstances posited in the memorandum: peace (routine); prewar (after deployment to emergency sites but before a nuclear exchange); trans-war (during a nuclear exchange); and recovery (after termination or during a pause in nuclear hostilities). The impracticality of a common list of requirements is suggested by the following comments:

a. In the first place, it is not clear whether the statements of prewar requirements envisioned a situation in which a US-USSR conventional conflict might be underway. Nor is it clear whether the trans-war requirements contemplated the situation in which nuclear weapons were used in a theater conflict, but had not yet been used for intercontinental strikes.

b. In general, we are unable to judge whether the required times shown in the list of requirements for reporting intelligence information to the Presidency are reasonable. The times were apparently derived from some consideration by the NICEP Support System Concept Subcommittee (SISSCO) of the types of decisions which the President would have to be prepared to make and how quickly the decisions would have to be made. The statement of essential tasks of concern of the Presidency is not sufficiently detailed to convey the rationale for the reporting times listed.

Related to the above, during periods of crisis when the risk of nuclear war is great, the President would have two related responsibilities: to seek by every means possible to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and to assure that the nation and its armed forces have maximized preparations for such a conflict should it occur. It is during this period that the President would have to decide on any first use of nuclear weapons. Also, if a nuclear war eventuates in the way currently judged as most likely, there would be a major US-USSR conventional conflict underway in some part

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of the world during the "Prewar" period envisioned in the statement of requirements. The product of the national indications and warning system concerning the imminence of nuclear war would be a vital requirement of the Presidency. Given this perception of the prenuclear conflict period, we cannot affirm the validity of the intelligence requirements listed in the "Prewar" column of the statement of requirements or the reporting times indicated.

c. At the present, intelligence does not seek to furnish the Presidency with all the information called for in the first column (peace) of the statement of information requirements within the times indicated. Furthermore, the first column does not list all the subjects on which intelligence seeks to keep the President informed during peacetime. It may well be the case that in order for the Presidency to be prepared for decisionmaking during prewar periods of crisis and after the outbreak of conventional or nuclear conflict the day-to-day intelligence information being furnished the White House should be revised. However, if this is the purpose of the information listing in the first column, the rationale for it should be expressed in the document.

d. The listing of foreign intelligence information requirements appears to be most applicable to the needs of the Presidency during a nuclear conflict. However, we can only assume from the subjects listed the types of decisions which were envisioned as having to be made by the President and how quickly they are expected to be made. It can be inferred from some of the intelligence requirements listed that the National Command Authority would be making detailed evaluations of the effects of US and Allied military operations and of the damage and losses inflicted on Western nations and their armed forces. This suggests that in developing the list of intelligence information requirements the drafters envisioned that tactical decisions about the employment of military forces would be made by the National Command Authority. This raises the questions of whether the intelligence requirements were developed on the assumption that decisions about the employment of military forces would be made at the lowest level or the highest level of command having sufficient information to make the decisions. To provide a rationale for the requirements, an explicit statement of assumptions about national level decisionmaking should be included. If the decisionmaking requirements of the Presidency are detailed in other planning documents prepared by the SSSCO, perhaps they could be referenced without repeating them in the statement of intelligence requirements.

e. The present list of requirements may prove to be unrealistic as a basis for development and acquisition of systems for intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. It is noted, for example, that the requirements during a nuclear conflict call for intelligence assets with enduring survivability that could provide the Presidency with intelligence of greater scope and timeliness than during peacetime when intelligence assets would not have been degraded by the effects of enemy attacks.

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f. Finally, it is difficult to separate national, foreign intelligence information requirements from the total information required by the National Command Authority for decisionmaking in a nuclear conflict. The total requirement is for the information to make what can be regarded as the "Commander-In-Chief's Estimate of the Situation." Indeed, much of the foreign intelligence information listed in the statement of requirements could come from US and Allied military commanders through command and control channels. The peacetime separation between national intelligence and national intelligence systems and tactical intelligence and supporting assets would disappear in any major conflict, especially a nuclear conflict.

3. We therefore suggest a more definitive approach to development of foreign intelligence requirements of the Presidency prior to, during and following a US-USSR conflict. The approach suggested below would break down anticipated decisions of the Presidency and the intelligence information required to support them according to more precise definitions of the phases of crisis and conflict envisioned by US plans and strategy.

a. Describe explicitly the several situations to which information requirements are related.

--Normal Peacetime. The information listed for this situation should not be all inclusive, covering the myriad of decisions of the Presidency not directly related to military conflict. It should contain a shred-out of the prewar information that should be maintained at the highest level (the National Command Authority) in order to be able to support Presidential decisions during periods of crises and conflict.

--Crises. This would be a period when the risk of nuclear war would be great, including a period of US-USSR conventional conflict and possibly nuclear conflict not involving US-USSR intercontinental nuclear exchanges. (This breakdown would limit the trans-war period as one involving only intercontinental nuclear conflict. It is presumed that this categorization is desired by the SSISSCO because this period would represent the most severe threat to the survivability of US command, control, communications and intelligence systems.)

--Trans-war. The period during intercontinental nuclear conflict.

--Recovery. The period following an intercontinental nuclear exchange or, as indicated in the present statement of requirements, a period in which intercontinental nuclear strikes had ceased temporarily.

b. Prepare, for each period, a listing of the type of decisions the Presidency or National Command Authority can be expected to make. In developing this list, careful consideration should be given to the decision-making prerogatives of subordinate commanders versus those of the President during wartime.

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c. Prepare statements of intelligence information requirements (for the production of intelligence) to support Presidential decisionmaking in each situation selected, instead of developing a single statement of requirements applicable in different degrees to the four situations.

4. It is believed that the proposed approach would facilitate (1) the correlation of current and planned intelligence and supporting systems with the information requirements in each situation, and (2) the identification of likely deficiencies in capabilities to satisfy intelligence requirements resulting from a degradation of intelligence and operational systems by enemy military actions.

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Assistant NIO for Strategic Programs

After a quick review of the attached NICEP material, SF has no major comments on your excellent draft response to D/NFAC. Three of the points you make are particularly cogent and deserve special emphasis:

-- That intelligence does not now seek to furnish the Presidency within the time indicated with all the information called for in the first column (peace) of the statement of information requirements. What is not done or practiced in peacetime will not (or cannot) be quickly done effectively in wartime or periods of high crisis.

-- That the demands on intelligence will be greater in wartime, but its assets will be degraded. Our dependence on certain high technology systems is acute and learning to make-do without some of them will take some time.

-- That the peacetime separation between national and tactical intelligence will "disappear" in any major conflict. On the other hand, the competition for (and access to) remaining assets will be intense.

I strongly support your suggestions on how the study should be restructured, particularly to relate specific Presidential decisions that likely will be required in various circumstances to specific intelligence requirements. It will be altogether too easy in this study to end up with almost "open-ended" intelligence requirements which would not be realistic or helpful to budget, collection system, or analytic planners.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

26 March 1981

NOTE FOR: C/NIC



Bruce would like you to take the
action on this, with help from Dick Kerr.
Thanks!



EA/DD/NFAC

cc: D/OCO

ACTION

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NIEPS 81-5820

NEAC 1730-81

25 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, NIC
Director, NFAC

FROM:

Director, National Intelligence Emergency
Planning Staff

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SUBJECT: Wartime Intelligence Requirements

1. The attached document listing presumed minimum emergency intelligence and information requirements of the Presidency during nuclear war or similar national emergency was prepared by a working group of the Intelligence Support System Concept Subcommittee of the National Intelligence Committee on Emergency Planning. The working group was chaired by the DIA member. The four time-phase columns of Enclosure 3 relate to expected operational phases of any Continuity of Government System: Peace (routine); Pre-war (after deployment to emergency sites but before nuclear exchange); Trans-war (during nuclear exchange); Recovery (after termination, or during pause, in nuclear hostilities).

2. Approval or "validation" of these requirements is viewed as mandatory before they can serve as a foundation for explicit planning for an emergency intelligence support system.

3. This listing has been vetted through the military intelligence services and by the State Department member of NIEPS. Before I pass it on to Admiral Inman, for further action, I would appreciate your comments. I would be pleased to have your response by 31 March.

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Attachment

NSA memo dtd 23 Mar 81, subj:
Intelligence Information
Requirements

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